In this article, we consider the physical layer security issue in Internet of Things systems, in which there exist a sensing transceiver pair, a number of candidate nodes, and an eavesdropper. The transceiver pair needs to select a jammer node and a relay node among the candidate nodes so as to preserve the secrecy of the communications. Considering the diversity of candidate channels and the limited available power, it is infeasible to scan all the nodes and find the optimal one. We formulate this jammer and relay selection problem as an optimal stopping problem under a fixed sensing order. Then, through applying dynamic programming solution, we propose a low-complexity approach to obtain the optimal sensing order. The performance of the proposed selection scheme is evaluated through numerical results.
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT), an advanced paradigm to support omnipresent connectivity among physical devices (e.g. sensors, actuators, and smart phones), gains its popular since it was first laid by K Ashton. 1 To connect things for exchanging and gathering information, wireless networks (such as wireless sensor networks [2] [3] [4] ) play an integral part in IoT. Yet, the wide adoption and deployment of IoT devices may shadowed by security threat. 5 Specially, devices in IoT are inherently impressionable to eavesdropping attacks. 6 Therefore, plenty of work needs to be devoted to improve the secrecy capacity in such an environment. Traditionally, security is considered as an issue in upper layers (e.g. the network layer) using cryptographic methods (e.g. encryption). 7, 8 However, these cryptographic methods may be hard to implement in IoT systems since key distribution, encryption, and decryption are costly and complex for low-profile IoT devices. 6 To solve the security issue in IoT systems, physical layer security has come to our mind. Different from the upper layer security, secret key is not needed in physical layer security, resulting in low complexity and low energy cost, which makes it more suitable for IoT devices. The basic thought of it is to make use of the features of the spectrum to prevent the eavesdropper from correctly decoding the information signals. [9] [10] [11] Specially, physical layer security methods attempt to destroy the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of the eavesdropper to maintain a positive value of secrecy capacity, which is defined as the maximum rate difference between the legitimate link and the transmitter-eavesdropper link. 12 In order to achieve a large secrecy capacity, cooperative jamming has been put forward. [13] [14] [15] The main idea of it is to confuse the eavesdropper via adopting artificial noises from a cooperative helper.
However, the existing cooperative jamming schemes may not be suitable for IoT systems since these schemes need the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of all users (we refer to as GCSI). As we know, the general approach to get GCSI is transmitting training signals for channel estimation between transmitter and receiver. Yet, in IoT systems, due to the restricted energy and the lack of high-rate feedback channels, the channel training opportunities are limited [6] . The acquisition of accurate GCSI is a waste of spectrum access occasions. As a result, it is prohibitively difficult to get the GCSI in IoT systems. Besides, in these schemes, one can notice that energy consumption is not designed as a constraint condition. However, this issue is a matter of great concern in IoT systems [16] . Thus, the problem of how to design a suitable cooperative jamming scheme in such an energy-limited network with only statistical CSI needs to be tackled.
To solve these problems, we first propose a joint jammer and relay selection scheme in an IoT system, in which there exist a sensing transmitter-receiver pair, some other candidate nodes, and an eavesdropper. The source needs to select two candidate nodes which are employed as the jammer and the relay, respectively. In the proposed scheme, the source tests the secrecy capacity of the candidate nodes in a certain sequential order. Due to the time and energy constraint, as we mentioned before, it is scarcely possible to sense all the candidate nodes to select the best relay and jammer. To solve this, we attempt to employ the optimal stopping theory to joint select proper jammer and relay nodes. Specifically, the first two candidate nodes (one acts as the relay and the other acts as the jammer) that satisfy the secrecy capacity thresholds are selected as the relay and the jammer, respectively. The optimal thresholds are calculated according to the probability distribution of candidate nodes' CSI and available power. Besides, just like Swindlehurst and colleagues, 14, 15 we assume the candidate nodes are all equipped with multiple antennas. To cancel out jamming signals at the legitimate receiver, the corresponding jamming vectors are designed. Finally, considering a more general case that each candidate node has its unique probability distribution of CSI and available power, a proper sensing order is needed since it can help the transmitter-receiver pair to find the superior candidate nodes to reduce time and energy cost and meanwhile improve the secrecy capacity. By applying dynamic programming, we propose a low-complexity method to obtain the sensing order.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section ''Related work'' presents the related work. The system model is pointed out in section ''System model.'' The joint relay and jammer selection scheme is derived in section ''Optimal stopping theory-based joint relay and jammer selection scheme.'' The performance evaluations are detailed in section ''Evaluation.'' Section ''Conclusion'' concludes the article.
Notations: ( Á ) and jj Á jj denote the Hermitian transpose of a matrix and the Euclidean norm, respectively. E½Á is the statistical expectation, while j Á j represents the absolute value. I denotes an identity matrix of corresponding dimension.
Related work
We summarize the related work under the categories of jamming schemes in physical layer security and optimal stopping theory-based schemes in wireless resource allocation.
Existing work on jamming schemes in physical layer security
Dong et al. 13 considered a three-node topology and used cooperative jamming to confuse the eavesdropper. As for the IoT system, Zhang et al. 17 proposed a jamming strategy among a large number of IoT devices. Huang and Swindlehurst 14 employed cooperative jamming in relay networks. Using convex optimization, the jamming covariance matrices were derived in this work.
Jammer selection plays an important role in the cooperative jamming-based physical layer security methods. To fulfill the security performance requirements, amounts of recent research works have been performed in the respect of jammer selection. [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] Chen et al. 18 investigated the joint jammer and relay selection scheme in an amplify-and-forward (AF)-based network. Similar to Chen et al., 18 Liu et al. 19 proposed a cooperative jamming scheme in a relay network, in which one relay node and one or two jammers are selected. In these works, the number of antennas is assumed to be 1. In the context of multi-antenna networks, Wang et al. 20 investigated the jammer selection issue, in which the secrecy capacity is maximized using a null-steering beamforming technique. Different from Wang et al., 20 Hui et al. 21 introduced another criterion, termed as secrecy outage probability to select jammers. In the work by Hui et al., 21 the node that can minimize the secrecy outage probability is selected as the jammer. To choose multiple friendly jammers, Wang et al. 22 attempted to select the nodes whose channels are orthogonal to the legitimate channel. In summary, these existing jammer selection schemes mainly pay attention to choose one or more jammers to optimize the security performance, assuming the instantaneous GCSI is known. However, to obtain the instantaneous GCSI, it is necessary to scan all the candidate nodes, resulting in a worse overall throughput since the time utilized for data transmissions is confined by the jammer selection process. And more importantly, as we mentioned before, due to the time and energy constraint in IoT systems, it is scarcely possible to sense all the candidate nodes. With the purpose of saving time and energy, we attempt to use the optimal stopping theory in the selection problem in IoT systems.
Existing work on the optimal stopping theory in wireless resource allocation As we know, the optimal stopping theory has been well studied in wireless communications such as opportunistic scheduling, relay selection, and spectrum sensing.
For example, the opportunistic scheduling is an important issue in many wireless networks. [23] [24] [25] Tan et al. 23 studied the distributed opportunistic scheduling problem through the use of stopping theory. In the scheduling scheme, the authors characterized the optimal scheduling policies under delay constraints. A distributed opportunistic scheduling framework was proposed by Li et al. 24 Besides, the optimal stopping theory is employed to investigate the problem of spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks. Shu and Krunz 26 considered the spectrum sensing issue as a stopping theory problem. An optimal decision strategy is suggested to enhance the overall network performance by maximizing the system rewards. Jia et al. 27 considered the problem of channel allocation in cognitive radio networks. In the context of relay selection, Jing et al. 28 proposed a stopping theory-based selection strategy, in which the node that can maximize the transmission throughput is selected as the relay. As far as we know, using the optimal stopping theory to address the joint jammer and relay selection issue in IoT systems remains a whitespace in existing literature.
System model

We establish a two-hop IoT system (Figure 1) , which consists of a sensing transmitter S, a sensing receiver D, an eavesdropper E, and M candidate nodes denoted by S CN = fCN 1 , CN 2 , . . . , CN M g. All the candidate nodes are assumed to own multiple antennas, while S, D, and E are equipped with only one antenna. In our model, the transmission process is divided into two phases. Assuming CN i and CN j are selected as the relay and the jammer, respectively, in the first transmission phase, the data signals are sent from S to CN i . To protect the signals from being overlapped by E, CN j performs cooperative jamming to confuse E. In the second phase, CN i transmits data signals to D, while CN j also transmits jamming signals to degrade the SINR at E. Accordingly, the overall system time slot (T) is divided into three phases: relay and jammer selection phase (Phase I), the first transmission phase (Phase II), and the second transmission phase (Phase III), as depicted in Figure 2 .
In Phase I, S observes the candidate nodes step by step. In a certain sensing step, S picks and senses two candidate nodes. The time needed for one observation step can be given as t. After sensing these two candidate nodes, S should make a decision regarding whether to select them as the relay and the jammer or to skip to the next sensing step. Suppose in the kth sensing step the corresponding sensed two nodes are selected, the total time cost for Phase I is T 1 = kt. Then, the selection process is terminated while the data transmission process (i.e. Phase II and Phase III) begins. The duration of Phase II and Phase III can be expressed as T 2 = a(T À kt) and T 3 = (1 À a)(T À kt), respectively, where 0\a\1.
Data transmission process
Transmission process in phase II. Without loss of generality, we assume CN i and CN j are selected as the relay and the jammer in Phase I. In Phase II, the signals received at CN i and E can be formulated as
where s p and s j are the information signals and jamming signals transmitted by S and CN j , respectively. The power constraints are expressed as E½js p j 2 = P S and E½js j j 2 = P CN j , respectively. The beamformer of CN j is given as u 1 CN j . n CN i and n E denote the noise power at CN i and E, respectively. We also define the following constants, vectors and matrices, and variables: h ij means the channel gain constant of i and j, where i 2 fS, CN j g and j 2 fS, CN i g, respectively. And so is H ij (h ij ).
To cancel out the undesired interference, a decoding vector can be designed at
This design is often termed as zero-forcing beamforming (ZFBF).
Then, the received signals at CN i are written as
After using ZFBF, one can see that CN j can inerrably receive and decode the information signals in phase II. As for the jamming beamformer u 1 CN j , since the undesirable interference caused by CN j can be successfully removed, u 1 CN j can be simply designed in the same direction of h CN j , E .
Transmission process in phase III. In Phase III, the signals received at the receiver and the eavesdropper can be given as
Without ambiguity, the information signals and the jamming signals are still denoted by s p and s j sent from CN i and CN j , respectively. The power constraints are denoted as E½js p j 2 = P CN i and E½js j j 2 = P CN j . The beamformers of CN i and CN j are defined as u 2 CN i and u 2 CN j . Similar to Phase I, h ij means the channel gain constant of i and j, where i 2 fCN i , CH j g and j 2 fD, Eg, respectively.
Since D only has one single antenna, we deliberately design u 2 CN j to null out the jamming signals at D, which can be given as
Using matrix transformation, this problem can be solved and u 2 CN j can be formulated as
For more information, one can refer to Gao et al. 29 Thus, the signals received at D can be given as
To be concluded, by carefully designing the jamming beamformer and information beamformer, no matter which candidate nodes are selected, the information signals can be perfectly transmitted from S to D since jamming signals are masked. 
Optimal stopping theory-based joint relay and jammer selection scheme
In section ''System model,'' choosing preferable relay and jammer has an important influence on the SINR at E. Intuitively, with the purpose of enhancing the secrecy capacity, the channel gain of the jammer-eavesdropper link needs to be greater, while the channel gain of the jammer-receiver should be smaller. And when it comes to the relay node, the situation is reversed. In this section, we attempt to employ the optimal stopping theory to construct the relay and jammer selection process (i.e. Phase I). With the purpose of maximizing the reward function, the source should decide to stop or to continue according to the comparison of the instantaneous reward and the value of expected reward in the subsequent sensing steps. The concepts of stopping theory are given as follows.
A sequence of random variables (i.e. X 1 , X 2 , . . . ) and the joint distribution are known a priori; A sequence of reward functions, (i.e. y 0 , y 1 (X 1 ), y 2 (X 1 , X 2 ), . . . , y ' (X 1 , X 2 , . . . )), which are realvalued functions of the random variables.
To be more specific, given these concepts, the optimal stopping problem can be formulated as follows: for each n = 1, 2, . . . step, after observing X 1 = x 1 , X 2 = x 2 , . . . , X n = x n , the decision of stopping or continuing should be made by the source in the light of the comparison of the instantaneous reward y 0 , y 1 (x 1 ), y 2 (x 1 , x 2 ), . . . , y ' (x 1 , x 2 , Á Á Á ) and the expected reward. In the next subsection, we attempt to get the expression of the reward function based on the secrecy capacity.
Reward function of secrecy capacity
As mentioned before, we assume CN i and CN j are selected as the relay and the jammer, respectively. In Phase II, the SINR at CN i and E can be calculated by
where g 1 CN i and g 1 E represent the SINR at CN i and E, during Phase II.
According to Huang and Swindlehurst, 30 the secrecy capacity in Phase II, denoted by C 1 s (CN i , CN j ), can be calculated as
Similarly, in Phase III, the SINR at D and E can be calculated by
And the secrecy capacity in Phase III, denoted by C 2 s (CN i , CN j ), can be calculated as
Since the eavesdropping attack can take place in Phase II and Phase III, both of the secrecy capacities C 1 s (CN i , CN j ) and C 2 s (CN i , CN j ) have to be positive to guarantee the secure transmission. Moreover, since the overall secrecy capacity subjects to the inferior phase, we define the achievable secrecy capacity as the smaller of C 1 s (CN i , CN j ) and C 2 s (CN i , CN j ), which can be given as
Then, we derive the reward function denoted by Y k . We consider a case that the sensing order is fixed. To be more specific, in the kth observation step, the kth candidate node and the k + 1th candidate node are sensed as the relay and the jammer, respectively. A tuning factor, denoted by c k , represents the stop of the sensing process at the kth observation step. And c k can be expressed as
According to equation (17), the value of c k decreases with an increase in the k. That is to say, the more CNs that S observed, the less the efficiency of the selection process, resulting in a shorter time for data transmission. The reward function after the kth observation step can be written as
Optimal selection scheme
In IoT systems, as mentioned before, the instantaneous GCSI is hard to obtain. Therefore, we assume only statistical GCSI is know a priori for S. The channel gains for nodes i and j are assumed to be selected from a set of discrete values H ¼ D fH l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L 1 g, where the distribution of jh i, j j 2 is given by Pr(jh i, j j 2 = h l ) = p i, j, l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L 1 . However, the instantaneous power of the candidate nodes is also hard to obtain. Similarly, the available power for candidate node i is selected from a finite set P ¼ D fP l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L 2 g. Let the distribution of P i be Pr(P i = P l ) = p i, l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L 2 Under these assumptions, we can derive the expected reward for each observation step. Denoted by V MÀ1 k (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ), the maximum reward after the kth observation step, which can be expressed as
where y k (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) represents the instantaneous reward if the selection process stops at the kth observation, and
. . , X k = x k means the expected reward of the k + 1th observation step. Note that the superscript of MÀ1 k is M À 1, since in this subsection, we assume the kth candidate node and the k + 1th candidate node are sensed as the relay and the jammer, respectively, in the kth observation step.
One can find that it is suitable to continue the selection process if
That is to say, Phase I stops at kth step and these two corresponding candidate nodes are selected if and only if the following condition holds 31
In the following, we propose to use the backward induction method to obtain the expected reward for each observation step, since the number of the observation steps is limited to M À 1. W MÀ1Àk represents the expected reward EfV MÀ1 k + 1 g if the selection process proceeds to the next observation step, which can be written as
In this subsection, we simply assume the distribution of the available power and the channel gains of each candidate node are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) variables. As a result, X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X MÀ1 can be treated as a series of i.i.d. variables, indicating that V MÀ1 k is only a function of X k and W MÀ1Àk . To get the expression of W MÀ1Àk , we begin with the derivation of the final step, that is, the M À 1th step. In the M À 1th step, the M À 1th and the Mth candidate nodes have to be selected. Thus, we set W 0 = À '. Then, according to equations (20) and (21), W 1 can be computed as equation (22) . And for k ! 1, W k + 1 can be computed as equation (23) .
min log 2 1 + P S h S, CN i , l 3 s 2 À log 2 1 + P S jh S, E j 2 P CN j , l 2 h CN i , E, l 6 + s 2 ! , log 2 1 + P CN i , l 1 h CN i , D, l 4 s 2 (
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks The process of the proposed selection scheme is shown in Algorithm 1. Similar to Huang and Swindlehurst 30 and Ly et al., 32 a common control channel (CCCH) is assumed to be set up for nodes to send the control information. First, S senses the candidate nodes according to a fixed sensing order (Line 1) and obtains the instantaneous reward y k in the kth sensing step (Line 8). Then, S compares the value of y k with the expected reward W MÀ1Àk and makes a decision of stopping at kth step if y k ! W MÀ1Àk or continuing the selection process to k + 1th step (Lines 9-13). Note that if the instantaneous rewards of the first M À 2 steps are all smaller than the corresponding expected reward, the selection process has to stop at the M À 1th step and the M À 1th and the Mth candidate nodes are selected as the relay and the jammer (Line 19).
Optimal sensing order
In the subsection ''optimal selection scheme'', we assume the distribution of the channel gains and the available power of each candidate node are i.i.d. variables. However, in a more general and practical case, each candidate node should have its unique probability distributions. Thus, one can find that the sensing sequence can dramatically affect the effectiveness of the selection process. To be more specific, it is easier for S to find superior candidate nodes by constructing an optimal sensing order before the selection process. Inspired by this, in this section, we attempt to find an optimal sensing order to optimize the selection process. Due to the unique characteristic of the candidate node, we redefine the channel gains of i to j exist in a finite set H i ¼ D fH i, j, l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L 1 g, where the distribution of jh i, j j 2 is given by Pr(jh i, j j 2 = h i, j, l ) = p i, j, l , l = 1, 2, . . . , L 1 . Similarly, the available power for candidate node i is selected from a finite set
At the M À 1th step, two candidate nodes are left to be selected. Considering the unique probability distribution of the candidate node, there exist M 2 À M possible states in this step. A state S MÀ1 CN i, j is defined as a set of sensing orders, namely fCN , CN , . . . , CN , CN i , CN j g |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl} (MÀ2)CN Note that the sequence of the first M À 2 candidate nodes can be a random sequence. And a state S MÀ1 CN i, j and another state S MÀ1 CN j, i are two different states. To be more specific, the former state indicates that in the M À 1th Algorithm 1: Optimal selection scheme. (22) and (23); 3: S starts the selection process by sensing CN 1 and CN 2 ; 4: for k = 1 to M À 1 do 5:
1: Construct the observation order, S CN
S sends an eager-to-help (ETH) frame to CN k and CN k + 1 6:
if S receives the able-to-help (ATH) frame from CN k and CN k + 1 then 7:
S gets the instantaneous CSI and the available power for these two nodes; 8:
S calculates the instantaneous rewards y k according to (16) -(18); 9:
S choose a large value of y k and W MÀ1Àk according to (20) ; 10:
if y k \W MÀ1Àk then 11:
S continues the selection process to k + 1 th step; 12: else 13:
The selection process stops at the current step and selects CN k and CN k + 1 as the relay and the jammer, respectively; 14:
end if 15: else 16:
Break; 17:
end if 18: end for 19: S selects CN MÀ1 and CN M as the relay and the jammer, respectively. step, CN i is sensed to be the relay, while CN j is sensed to be the jammer. The latter state means CN i and CN j are sensed as the jammer and the relay, respectively. For state S MÀ1 CN i, j , the expected reward is given as equation (24) .
At the kth observation step, a certain state, say S k CN p, q , indicates S chooses CN p and CN q to sense. The expected reward regarding to S k CN p, q is denoted as equation (25) . At each observation step, S can record which state results in the maximum expected reward. Thus, the optimal sensing order can be obtained based on the optimal state that recorded by S at each observation step. Another approach to derive the optimal sensing order is to use brute force to scan all the possible orders. S can calculate the maximum expected reward of each step with Algorithm 1 in a certain order. One can find that our proposed approach can significantly reduce the computation overhead compared with the brute force search method.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme through simulation experiments. As described in section ''System model,'' all the CNs are assumed with four antennas while the system slot is assumed to be 0.2 ms. We assume the distribution of the channel power gain is f0:5, 1, 1:5, 2, 2:5, 3g with probability f0:43, 0:2, 0:1, 0:11, 0:08, 0:08g. And the distribution of the available power is f1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10g with probability f0:35, 0:25, 0:15, 0:1, 0:1, 0:05g. The transmit power of S is assumed as 5 mW. For the sake of simplicity, the parameter a that has no influence on the selection scheme is set to be $ 0.5$.
Simulation study of fixed sensing order
In this subsection, we pay attention to the case that the sensing order is fixed, namely, the candidate nodes are sensed from 1 to M one by one. The time cost of one observation step is 2 ms with M = 4, 6, 8, . . . , 20.
First, we compare the optimal stopping theorybased scheme with a random selection scheme, in which the jammer and the relay are randomly selected by S. Figure 3 shows the secrecy capacity versus the number of candidate nodes. The proposed selection scheme can remarkably improve the secrecy capacity.
Moreover, the variation trend of secrecy capacity in the random scheme is observed to change with no rules. However, the proposed scheme performs a continuous growth with an increase in the network size. Besides, one can also notice the secrecy capacity levels off with a large number of the candidate nodes. It can be explained that when the number is small, with the increased number of the candidate nodes, there are more opportunities for S to choose suitable nodes. For a larger number of the candidate nodes, however, a marginal increase in the candidate nodes has little impact on variations of the channel gain and the available power.
In Figure 4 , the impact of the sensing time on the secrecy capacity is detailed. With an increase in the sensing time, less time can be used for data transmission, which leads to a poorer performance regardless of the network size. Figure 5 reports the impact of the sensing time on the number of sensing steps, which is observed to be increased with the number of candidate nodes. The reason can be given as with an increase in the candidate nodes, S has more chance to find suitable nodes. According to Figure 4 , one can also notice that the secrecy capability is more likely to be affected with a large network size. This can be understood by the fact that with more sensing steps and bigger sensing times, the performance is drastically reduced when the network size increases. In Figure 5 , one can also find that in a fixed network size, the sensing time almost has no effect on the number of sensing steps. This demonstrates the convergence property of the proposed selection scheme.
Simulation study of optimal sensing order Note that in section ''Simulation study of fixed sensing order,'' we assume the distributions of the available power and the channel gains are i.i.d. variables for all the candidate nodes. In this subsection, the performance of our scheme is evaluated with the optimal sensing order by changing the distribution of the available power. That is to say, each candidate node has its unique probability distribution of the available power. We compare the proposed optimal sensing order with that of a fixed one, which is defined as the descending order. For example, when the candidate nodes set M as 4, the fixed sensing order can be given as [4, 3, 2, 1] . Figure 6 represents the secrecy capacity achieved by these two sensing orders versus the number of candidate nodes. One can find that the performance of the optimal sensing order outperforms that of the fixed sensing order, which verifies the analysis in section ''Optimal sensing order.'' The increase in the secrecy capacity is observed to level off with a large number of the candidate nodes. The same conclusion can also be found in Figure 3 . In Figure 7 , the number of sensing steps versus the number of candidate nodes is plotted. One can see that the optimal sensing order can effectively reduce the sensing time of the proposed selection scheme.
Conclusion
In this article, we have investigated the joint jammer and relay selection issue in an IoT system, which consists of a sensing transmitter, a sensing receiver, some candidate nodes, and an eavesdropper. With the purpose of maximizing the secrecy capacity, we have formulated the selection process as an optimal stopping theory by considering the channel gains and the available power. The first two candidate nodes (one acts as the relay and the other acts as the jammer) that satisfy the secrecy capacity thresholds are selected as the relay and the jammer, respectively. The optimal thresholds are calculated according to the probability distribution of candidate nodes' CSI and available power. Then, considering a more general case that each candidate node has its unique probability distribution of CSI and available power, we have proposed a low-complexity method to obtain the optimal sensing order, by applying dynamic programming. 
